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NAFTA AND ITS TWENTY-YEAR EFFECT
ON IMMIGRATION
Natalie Sears*
I. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT-
TWENTY YEARS LATER
HE North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) recently
celebrated its twenty-year anniversary.' NAFTA took effect on
January 1, 1994, and created a free trade zone between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada.2 NAFTA governs trade occurring between
the participating countries, including the acquisitions of goods, construc-
tions and services. 3
When first proposed, NAFTA was predicted by many to serve as a
quick-fix for illegal immigration occurring at the Mexican-United States
border.4 Many supporters of NAFTA predicted Mexico's economy to ex-
perience significant growth after NAFTA's implementation, including the
creation and expansion of jobs and industries within Mexico. 5 Those
NAFTA proponents predicted that this economic growth would improve
the lives of many Mexican workers, thus reducing their incentive for mi-
gration to the United States.6
When drafting NAFTA and predicting its effect on U.S. immigration,
different assumptions came into play regarding how the participating
countries and citizens would react to NAFTA's implementation. 7 But
those assumptions, including assumptions about the way the Mexican
government would behave and the way its markets would respond,
proved contrary to prediction. 8 In fact, in the twenty years since NAFIrA
was implemented, we have seen quite the opposite effect.
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Many people believed illegal immigration was not a concern in relation
to NAFTA because they believed wage disparities between Mexico and
the United States would actually fall, thus reducing the number of illegal
immigrants making their way from Mexico to the United States. 9 The
prediction was that NAFTFA would decrease wage differences by provid-
ing a greater market for Mexican exports in a more efficient, accessible
manner. 10 Many of those in support of this argument theorized that re-
duced investment barriers inherent in NAFTA coupled with lower wages
found in Mexico would entice Canada and the United States to expand its
employment opportunities into Mexico. 1' These supporters predicted a
subsequent demand for workers in Mexico coupled with lowered demand
for workers in the United States and Canada, thereby narrowing the
wage gap among the three countries. 12
But an opposed minority believed that NAFTA would actually increase
illegal immigration-the exact result we see today, twenty years after
NAFTA's original implementation. One particular legal scholar noted
the relatively small size of Mexico's economy would make it difficult for
Mexico to adjust to international shocks.' 3 Other opponents, including
the State of California, argued that NAFfA would actually invite in-
creased immigration from Mexico and argued for increased regulation
following NAFTA's implementation.1 4 As we know today, NAFTA did
not regulate or give incentive for further immigration regulation stan-
dards because the majority of people believed NAFTA would actually
improve the immigration situation of the United States.
II. THE FLOODGATES OF IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO
INTO THE UNITED STATES
A. IMMIGRATION-Is NAFTA TO BLAME?
When NAFTA was drafted and implemented in 1994, supporters be-
lieved its established free-trade zone would stimulate economic growth
and shrink wage disparities between the three participating countries. 15
But the facts prove that such prediction did not work out. With regard to
the increased immigration resulting from NAFIA, in 1995, there were 2.5
million Mexican illegal immigrants in the United States and by 2006 that
number had almost quadrupled to eight million.1 6
Many Mexicans have made desperate attempts-even risking their
lives-to enter the United States since NAFTA, and its adverse economic
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effects came into play beginning in 1994.17 In 2006, it was reported that
during that year, almost 400 Mexican citizens died trying to enter the
United States. 18 Legal scholars have called this immigration movement
the "network effect" because today, twenty years after NAFTA was im-
plemented, many young Mexicans travel illegally into the United States
to join the growing number of their family members already living
there. 19
How exactly NAFTA caused this dramatic increase in illegal immigra-
tion of Mexican citizens can be explained through two routes-which
both boil down to the adverse effects experienced by Mexico's national
economy. First, the U.S. subsidies given to American farmers drove out
small-business Mexican farmers through the exportation of crops, such as
corn. Second, NAFTA's tariff reductions led to foreign expansion of
American and Canadian companies, whose prices beat the small busi-
nesses found in Mexico, causing them to shut down.20
B. U.S. SUBSIDIES GIVEN TO AMERICAN FARMERS CAUSE
EXPORTATION OF TRADITIONAL MEXICAN CROPS
A very large portion of Mexican citizens live in rural areas and rely on
farming as their income-even though it does not provide more than a
poverty-level lifestyle. Approximately twenty-four million Mexicans live
in rural areas of their country.21 It has been reported that those twenty-
four million people account for approximately 8 percent of Mexico's
gross domestic product and, therefore, live in extreme poverty.2 2 Legal
theorists argued that because of the extreme living conditions these Mexi-
cans endure, they will either move towards urban Mexico or to the
United States.23 Their theory is that even without regard to NAFTA,
many Mexicans have a great incentive to move to the United States in
search of a better lifestyle. 24 But, while there, many of those Mexicans
live on farms and produce the country's biggest food staples-corn and
beans.25
During its NAFTA negotiations, Mexico agreed to remove its country's
protection against the import of agricultural products over a ten-year pe-
riod following NAFTA's implementation. 26 This decision is exactly what
worried most of those opposing NAFTA on immigration grounds.27
Some NAFTA supporters initially pled for an improvement in the rela-
tionship between the United States and Mexico, and believed that in-
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tensely preparing for Mexican immigration would damage that
relationship. 28 But these proponents clearly did not predict the intense
immigration that would result from the implementation of NAFTA-es-
pecially the shift in exports and imports between the two countries and
the vital agricultural crop of corn.
"NAFTA, by permitting heavily-subsidized U.S. corn and other agri-
business product to compete" with local Mexican farmers, "has driven
many of those Mexican farmers" off their lands in search of alternative
employment. 29 As a result, many of these farmers cross the border to the
United States in search of other ways to earn a living. 30
NAFTA reduced tariffs and allowed the United States to grant large
subsidies to American farmers.3 1 These farmers were then able to export
their agricultural goods for a cheaper price, thereby lowering the amount
of goods Mexican farmers could and needed to export to the United
States.32 Many Mexican farmers depended on such exportation as their
income, and the subsidies issued to U.S. farmers prevented them from
profitably continuing agricultural practices. 33 The result was that Mexi-
can farmers couldn't support themselves anymore, so they illegally mi-
grated to the United States in search of other income.
The lost job opportunities were not only experienced in Mexico. From
1994 to 2005, it was reported that one million job opportunities were lost
across the United States because of NAFFA.34 The two states that lost
the most jobs in that time frame were those sharing borders with Mex-
ico.35 In those eleven years, California lost 123,995 jobs, while Texas lost
72,257.36 The experience in both Mexico and the United States was simi-
lar-lost job opportunities caused by an influx of economic changes.
Mexico experienced dramatic increases in foreign manufacturing invest-
ment, while the U.S. workers experienced competition with the dramatic
increases in Mexican immigration.
When it was passed, NAFTA was silent on protections for both labor
and environmental standards. 3 7 As a result, many legal scholars believe
that NAFIA has really benefited the investor, but not the average la-
28. Weintraub, supra note 14, at 29.
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30. Id.
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borer. 38 These adverse consequences had dramatic effects on Mexico's
agricultural and manufacturing industries. In addition, the real wages of
Mexican manufacturers have fallen dramatically. 39 This change was the
complete opposite of what NAFTA supporters initially predicted would
happen. Even worse, within the Mexican agricultural sector, where one-
fifth of Mexicans still work, there have been 1.3 million lost jobs.40
To really understand the impact of agricultural labor changes that have
occurred due to NAFTA, consider the difference between exports and
imports. For example, if the United States exports 1,000 cars to Mexico,
then many U.S. workers would be employed in the production of those
cars. On the contrary, if the United States imports, rather than build
their own, 1,000 cars from Mexico, the U.S. workers, who otherwise
would have built them, are without work. This is exactly what happened
to a large portion of Mexican workers in the agricultural and manufactur-
ing sector.4 1 This is also exactly what California, which took the minority
position, predicted-NAFTA would actually increase illegal
immigration. 42
California was a part of the opponents who argued that NAFTA, "es-
pecially its provisions opening Mexico to agricultural imports from the
United States," would increase the amount of undocumented immigrants
traveling from Mexico to the United States.43 The NAFFA supporters
claimed that it would improve Mexico's economy by increasing incomes
at home and thereby decreasing their incentive for immigration.
44
C. NAFTA's TARIFF REDUCTIONs LED TO FOREIGN EXPANSION
AND LOCAL SHUT-DOWN
When considering the passing of NAFTA, the U.S. government as-
sumed many farmers would continue farming in Mexico, even as less-
expensive corn was imported from the United States and flooded the
Mexican market.45 Instead, the Mexican "farmers exported themselves"
in search of more profitable ventures. 46 In addition, many U.S. compa-
nies and investors began investing in Mexico and predicted a large eco-
nomic growth would occur.47 To the contrary, when the large U.S.
companies, such as Wal-Mart, began to expand into Mexico, many local
Mexican business-owners and farmers lost their jobs because they could
not compete with the low-price models that the U.S. companies could
provide. 48
38. Id.
39. SCOTT & RATNER, supra note 34, at 2.
40. Id.
41. Bybee & Winter, supra note 8.
42. Weintraub, supra note 14.
43. Id.
44. Bybee & Winter, supra note 8.
45. Uchitelle, supra note 4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Bybee & Winter, supra note 8.
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Although an initial prediction was to expect more job opportunities for
Mexican workers as a result of foreign expansion within the country, the
lower prices of these U.S. giants drove out thousands of Mexican work-
ers.49 This resulted in almost 28,000 small businesses shutting down be-
cause they could not compete against the retail giants in the United
States.50
The manufacturing industry of Mexico also experienced significant
changes. When NAFTA came into effect in 1994, U.S. investment
flooded Mexico and provided financing for manufacturing factories.
51
The Mexican government simultaneously assured the United States that
it would provide its own investment for its citizens' needs such as new
roads, schools, and sanitation to accommodate the new factories. 52 But
this investment never took place and the amount of foreign investment
began to displace the technological culture of Mexico.
53
D. NAFTA, DESPITE ITS PROBLEMS, CONTINUES TO SERVE AS
MODEL FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS
Despite the numerous unintended consequences of NAFTA on Mex-
ico's economy and the U.S. immigration situation, NAFTA still serves as
the model for trade agreements in developing Latin countries.54 NAFTA
served as the model for the Central American Free Trade Agreement,
passed by Congress in 2005, and other agreements involving Panama, Co-
lumbia, and Peru.5 5
The free trade zone NAFTA established has clearly had positive effects
in some aspects, but drawbacks in others. While the United States can
certainly claim to have reaped benefits from this agreement, it could be
argued that Mexico, with the right societal improvements, could have ex-
perienced the same improvements.
III. REVERSING THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF NAFFA
In 2005, it was reported that since NAFTFA took effect in 1994, wages
for most Mexican workers had either stagnated or declined. 56 In fact,
some reports show that wages among the Mexican border have decreased
by about 25 percent since NAFTA's implementation. 57 In addition, it has
been reported that 1.3 million Mexican farmers were driven out of busi-
ness since NAFTA, and the monthly income for the rural farmers shrank
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Uchitelle, supra note 4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sco-r & RArNER, supra note 34, at 1.
55. Uchitelle, supra note 4.
56. Sco-r & RATNER, supra note 34, at 3.
57. Bybee & Winter, supra note 16.
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from 1,959 pesos per month in 1991 to 228 pesos per month in 2003.58 A
combination of factors caused these results.
Although NAFTFA did not specifically address or even mention immi-
gration in its text, it is clear that everyone expected it to improve Mex-
ico's economy and foreign investment between the three countries. 59 But
once U.S. manufacturers began flooding Mexico with their investments,
Mexico's economy seemed to crumble. It could not keep up with the
demands, nor was it prepared to do so.60 In addition, the competition of
China's low wages caused U.S. investors to direct their money in Chinese
investments.61
In order for the United States to prevent further illegal immigration
into its country, something must be done. NAFTA clearly did not intend
for this effect, nor was it prepared to deal with something of this magni-
tude. Some economists believe the solution to stop or decrease illegal
immigration is to increase Mexico's wages. 62 This might be especially
true because when the Mexico peso devalued in the early 2000s, the coun-
try experienced even deeper economic struggles.
63
Recent trends, however, show that the Mexican economy may be im-
proving after all, no thanks to NAFIA or its regulations.64 At the recent
World Economic Forum, Mexico was considered to be one of the top
options for investments because its market has an expected 2014 growth
rate of 4 percent, while other markets like Brazil, Russia, and India are
expected to weaken.6 5 In addition, many factories that were previously
transferred to China are expected to return to Mexico due to higher
transportation costs and increased wages in China.66
If Mexico's economy can support an increase in wages, an improved
lifestyle for Mexican workers would likely follow and probably result in
less of an incentive to migrate to the United States in search of more
fruitful employment. It may be that NAFTA was implemented too soon
to accommodate Mexico's socio-economic conditions. But if Mexico can
make the turn-around that is expected of them, then NAFTA may begin
to prove fruitful for that country after all.
IV. THE FUTURE OF NAFTA
The huge influx of immigration resulting from NAFIA's implementa-
tion twenty years ago could be a culmination of many factors. The U.S.
58. Pramilla Jayapal, OneAmerica Exec. Dir., Comments from the Urban Poverty Fo-
rum (Feb. 13, 2011).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Bybee & Winter, supra note 8.
62. Luis Vieira, Raising Wages in Mexico Could Sharply Reduce Illegal Immigration,
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subsidies, exportation of Mexico's biggest crop, corn, or even its invest-
ment in the manufacturing industry all combined to simply overwhelm
Mexico's economy. As a result, thousands of Mexican workers migrated
to the United States in search of alternative employment opportunities.
Because it has been twenty years since NAFTA was put into effect, the
migration effects have only compounded into what some scholars call the
"network effect."' 67 This network effect can be seen through second-gen-
eration family members who are now moving from Mexico to join their
elder family members in the United States. 68
But NAFTA, despite its criticisms, is clearly here to stay. It currently
serves as a model for many other treaties, including agreements with
countries such as Panama, Columbia, and Peru. 69 Whatever adverse ef-
fects followed NAFTA's implementation, those aspects have clearly been
perceived as far outweighed by its positive, economic-stimulating effects.
67. Uchitelle, supra note 4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
